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Where the poor form a majority or near-majority, 
why don’t they vote themselves to power in 
democracies? In Madagascar, Mozambique, Mali, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya, and Bangladesh, 
where the poor constitute 71, 70, 64, 56, 53, 52, and 
50 percent of the population, respectively, why don’t 
poor groups emerge and take power democratically? 
Even in countries where the poor form a smaller but 
still sizable part of the population—such as India (29 
percent), Ecuador (35 percent), and the Philippines 
(37 percent)—why are the politics of poverty not 
more emphatic, potent, and visible? Traditionally 
these questions have been answered by referring to 
factors that create divisions among the poor, such  
as caste, religion, or tribe; but a more fundamental 
basis of division also exists, emanating from the 
separate relationships that different poor people 
have with poverty itself. 
Not everyone who is poor was born into poverty. 
New research shows that large numbers of poor 
people have fallen into poverty within their lifetimes. 
Their relationship with poverty is qualitatively 
different from that of people who have been 
chronically poor. Different trajectories into and out  
of poverty define different relationships that produce 
different identities and interests among subgroups  
of poor people. Apart from those who have newly 
fallen into poverty and those who are persistently 
poor, a further subgroup consists of upwardly mobile 
poor people on the cusp of escaping poverty. 
Members of each of these subgroups have quite 
different interests, and their demands from the state 
are correspondingly disparate. These divisions make 
it difficult for poor people to unite and make common 
cause. Rather than considering “the poor” as a 
homogeneous group requiring some common policy 
responses, it is preferable to take account of 
subgroup-specific requirements. Policymakers 
intending to deal more effectively with poverty will 
do well to mount a more comprehensive response. 
Unless the creation of new poverty is first stemmed, 
efforts to move people out of poverty will ultimately 
be ineffective. Mounting a more comprehensive 
response—addressing escape and descent 
concurrently—will also help empower poor people 
socially and politically. 
Poverty Creation in the Midst of  
Economic Growth 
Poverty is being constantly refreshed, with two 
concurrent streams flowing in parallel. Even as some 
people escape poverty, others are simultaneously 
falling into poverty. The numbers on both sides are 
large, though they vary across contexts. Everywhere, 
however, the rate of falling into poverty is worryingly 
high (Box 1). Large movements in both directions 
constantly reconfigure the composition of “the poor.” 
Until relatively recently, however, these movements 
were hidden from view. Conventionally, poverty has 
been measured as a stock, considering the numbers 
of poor people at a particular moment in time. Such 
stocks can be compared across two points in time 
and the net change calculated. Such analysis does 
not reveal, however, exactly how this change was 
derived: how many people fell into poverty within the 
specified time frame, and how many others 
concurrently escaped poverty? 
It is only quite recently, mostly within the past 5 
to 10 years, that scholars working independently in 
different parts of the world have examined poverty in 
a dynamic context. These studies collectively help 
construct a new and more complete view of how 
poverty is simultaneously created and reduced. 
Regardless of the country or period studied or the 
definitions and methodology used, the results are the 
same: descents and escapes occur concurrently. A 
study of more than 1,000 households in KwaZulu-
Natal, South Africa, shows that while 10 percent of 
households moved upward out of poverty over the 
five-year period 1993–98, another 25 percent of 
households simultaneously fell into poverty. 
Ironically, and quite counter-intuitively, poverty 
increased overall even as many people moved out of 
poverty. Similarly, in Bangladesh over the 13-year 
period 1987–2000, 26 percent of households studied 
escaped poverty, but another 18 percent of 
households concurrently fell into poverty. Movements 
both out of and into poverty are large in every 
instance.  
  These movements into and out of poverty are 
not marginal or temporary events. Thus, people do 
not fall into poverty only to escape in a later period, 
nor indeed are these results confined to borderline 
households fluctuating around the poverty line. For 
instance, in Uganda, only one-third of households 
that fell into poverty during the 15-year period 1979–
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94, were able to escape from poverty over the next 
10 years. The remaining two-thirds were still poor 
when investigations were conducted in 2004. 
Meanwhile, an additional 11 percent of households 
had fallen into poverty, further adding to the ranks of 
the poor in these communities. 
Box 1—The Complexity Underlying Net Poverty Changes 
The realization of the complexity underlying net poverty changes 
emerged through the process of conducting studies of household 
poverty dynamics over the past six years in countries of Africa, 
Asia, and North and South America using the Stages-of-Progress 
methodology, which enables measurement and comparison to be 
made reliably and reasonably quickly. More importantly, this 
methodology enabled the identification of the factors associated 
with movements out of and into poverty. Research teams 
interviewed more than 25,000 people, identifying who had 
escaped poverty and why, and who had fallen into poverty and 
why. These teams met hundreds of very poor people who had not 
been poor 5, 10, or 20 years earlier. Their accounts of descents 
into poverty were awful to hear, but they provided an 
understanding of the incompleteness and ultimate futility of most 
current efforts to reduce poverty. 
  The data reproduced below show, for example, that even as 
19 percent of people came out of poverty in the 20 western 
Kenyan villages studied, another 18 percent fell into poverty, 
resulting in a net reduction of only 1 percent. Such paltry gains 
have become frustratingly familiar from newspaper accounts, the 
inference being that nothing much seems to be happening. In 
truth, a great deal is happening (Table 1).  
  Each row in Table 1 relates to a separate study, and each row 
illustrates the fundamentally dynamic nature of poverty. Take 
Andhra Pradesh, for example: 14 percent of people in villages 
studied there came out of poverty over the 25-year period 1979–
2004, but another 12 percent fell into poverty over that period. 
Overall, only a 2 percent reduction in poverty resulted, but a total 
of 26 percent of all households experienced a change in their 
poverty status. Similarly large movements have been experienced 
elsewhere. Net change in poverty was only 9 percent in the 
studied Uganda villages, but 39 percent of people fell into or came 
out of poverty. 
Table 1—Households Escaping from and Descending into 
Poverty over 25 years 







Rajasthan, India: 35 communities, 
6,376 households 
11 8 
Gujarat, India: 36 communities, 
5,817 households 
9 6 
Andhra Pradesh, India:  
36 communities, 5,536 households 
14 12 
Western Kenya: 20 communities, 
1,706 households 
18 19 
Central and Western Uganda:  
36 communities, 2,631 households 
24 15 
Cajamarca and Puno, Peru:  
40 communities, 3,817 households 
17   8 
North Carolina, United States:  
13 communities, 312 households
a 
23 12 
Source: Compiled by author; see www.pubpol.duke.edu/krishna for 
more information. 
Movement reconstitutes the profile of people in 
poverty. Who is poor at the end of a period is 
considerably different from who was poor at the 
beginning. “The poor” is a swiftly changing and 
diverse collection of people, with subgroups that are 
traveling in opposite directions. For this reason 
alone, it is difficult for all who happen to be poor at 
some moment in time to consider themselves part of 
some collective-action group; but there is also 
another reason related to the different factors that 
are associated, respectively, with movements into 
and out of poverty. Escaping poverty and falling into 
poverty are not symmetric in terms of their 
underlying causes. As a result, two separate sets of 
policies are required to address these two issues. 
Those countries that have adopted both sets of 
policies are also the ones in which poverty has been 
reduced to single digits. Other countries have been 
less successful. 
Asymmetric Reasons for Escape and Descent 
Ill health and high health care costs are associated 
with the majority of descents studied. In low-income 
regions, such as rural Rajasthan or urban Nairobi, as 
much as in high-income areas, such as North 
Carolina in the United States, the majority of 
households that became poor faced one or more 
serious illnesses (or injuries) in their family. Other 
people, who were poor constantly, also faced one or 
more episodes of debilitating ill health. Ill health 
imposes a double whammy—when high treatment 
costs go together with loss of earning power—and it 
has the biggest influence on becoming poor in all 
regions underlying this study, including Gujarat, a 
state with economic growth rates of 9 percent and 
higher. Health is an equally critical factor of descent 
in areas of Kenya, Uganda, and Peru. The positive 
influences that families experience when new 
earning opportunities come their way become 
nullified when health care expenses take a bigger 
bite out of the household budget. Other factors also 
matter, but nowhere do these factors matter as 
much as or more than ill health (Table 2). 
Researchers comparing trends across multiple, 
diverse countries have concluded similarly: a 
“medical poverty trap” is driving thousands into 
poverty. Thousands of families are living one illness 
away from poverty, and thousands have become 
deeply indebted on account of health-related costs. 
Escaping poverty is responsive to an entirely 
different set of reasons (Table 3). Developing a new 
income source is most importantly associated with 
successful escapes. Jobs in the government and 
private sectors are important for this purpose, but 
they are not always quantitatively the most 
important reason for escape. Diversification within 
agriculture has been more important in several 
regions, and new sources of income from the urban 
informal sector constituted the primary reason for 
escape in some other regions. About three-quarters 
of all escapes examined through the research 
underlying this brief were associated with income 
diversification through informal sector occupations 
and agriculture.  
Assistance in the form of education, 
transportation and communication links, agricultural 
infrastructure, irrigation, and regular information 
about available opportunities are regarded by the 
people involved as important for facilitating their 
escapes out of poverty. On the other hand, the 
subgroup of the newly poor, having faced different  
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experiences, prefers to have very different types of 
policy supports—most notably, better health care. 
Consequently, their demands from the state are 
quite different from those of the upwardly mobile 
subgroup of poor people. One study conducted in 
early 2004 in 36 villages of Andhra Pradesh, India, 
shows how putatively similar demands of “the poor” 
diverge so significantly across different subgroups. 
All households in these villages were classified within 
four mutually exclusive subgroups: those who were 
poor seven years ago and also poor in 2004 (the 
persistently poor); those who were poor seven years 
ago but had since escaped from poverty (the 
formerly poor); those who were not poor seven 
years ago but had since fallen into poverty (the 
newly poor); and those who were not poor at either 
point in time (not poor). Hence, apart from the not 
poor subgroup, members of the other subgroupings 
could be included, at one time or another, within the 
omnibus category of “the poor.” More than 1,000 
adult residents were selected for interview using 
random sampling. A list of major demands had been 
constructed and pilot-tested earlier. Respondents 
were asked to rank these demands in order of 
priority. 
People belonging to the different subgroups are 
not very different in terms of gender, age, caste, 
religion, or education. But demands from the state 
vary considerably across these subgroups. Wage 
labor is the most important demand of the 
persistently poor. As many as 46 percent of 
respondents in this subgroup rated this demand 
among their top-three priorities, but only 8 percent 
of the newly poor and only 5 percent of the formerly 
poor considered this demand among their top-three 
priorities. Better health care services constituted the 
top demand of respondents from the newly poor 
subgroup, as could be expected, given that ill-health 
was the most important reason associated with their 
impoverishment. The largest group of newly poor 
respondents, 34 percent, regarded health care 
services as a critical demand from the state. 
However, only 8 percent of persistently poor 
respondents and only 7 percent of formerly poor 
respondents considered health care their key 
demand from the state.  
Housing support was another key demand by 
newly poor respondents, but relatively few 
respondents from the other two subgroups—less 
than 10 percent in all—considered housing support 
among their top-three demands from the state. 
Members of the third subgroup, the formerly poor, 
have still different demands. Irrigation, high schools, 
and jobs are their most important demands. These 
were the means that helped take members of this 
subgroup out of poverty in the past, and these were 
their key demands in the present as well. These 
highest-priority demands for the formerly poor 
subgroup ranked quite low, however, for members of 
the other two subgroups. Hence, because they face 
different opportunities and have experienced 
different threats, different subgroups of the poor 
have quite different demands from the state, making 
it even more difficult to organize poor people for 
collective action.  
Conclusion 
A sluggish pace of net poverty reduction does not 
occur because there is no movement out of poverty. 
It is a result of two large and frequently offsetting 
trends: large numbers of people are falling into 
poverty, even as large numbers make their escape. 
Until poverty prevention is more effectively targeted, 
poverty reduction will, at best, be a transient gain. 
These aspects of poverty’s fundamentally dynamic 
nature have come to be understood only quite 
recently as a critical mass of studies has emerged to 
track households and individuals over time and 
examine movements in and out of poverty. As a 
result, it is now known that many poor people—the 
majority in some cases—were not born poor, nor 
have they always been poor. Many have become 
poor within their lifetimes. On the other hand, many 
others who were poor in the past have risen out of 
this state in recent times, and yet others are on the 
cusp of escaping poverty.  
Disaggregating the poor into these constituent 
subgroups serves a number of important functions. 
First, it facilitates a better understanding of the 
sources of poverty, in particular allowing us to 
consider how poverty is freshly created and how 
such new creation can be controlled more effectively. 
Such a disaggregated view aids in the design of 
more cost-effective policies. It may prove less 
expensive to increase protective measures that 
prevent the creation of poverty rather than to invest 
in poverty relief only after people have fallen into 
poverty. How much, for instance, does a government 
spend on housing and other welfare assistance than 
could have been saved earlier in the process through 
better medical coverage? Second, considering 
different subgroups provides a more nuanced and 
ultimately more useful means for analyzing the 
politics of the poor. It shows that requirements of 
the state depend not so much on where households 
lie on the income scale at any given moment but on 
which direction they are moving. Two households 
with the same level of income or wealth cannot be 
assumed to have similar interests; if one has fallen 
into poverty while the other is persistently poor, their 
interests will more likely diverge than be similar.  
It is useful for all of these reasons to examine 
poverty not as it is often visualized—that is, a 
somewhat homogeneous mass—but as it really is: an 
inconstant, internally differentiated, and fluid 
collection of individuals who are moving in different 
directions at the same point of time. “The poor” is 
merely a figure of speech. Those to whom it refers 
have different identities and interests, and distinct 
trajectories vis-à-vis poverty. Policymakers will do 
well to address separately the disparate 
requirements of different subgroups. Assisting 
escapes from poverty has always been and should 
remain an important pillar of policy, but assistance is  
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required equally urgently to prevent descents into 
poverty. Efforts to move more people out of 
poverty—through job creation in the formal and 
informal sectors, irrigation, education, and the like—
will need to be accompanied by parallel efforts to 
prevent or at least slow down descents into poverty. 
Waiting until someone arrives into poverty should 
hardly be the sole time to provide assistance. Acting 
preemptively is not only better; it may be the only 
way to overcome poverty comprehensively. Dealing 
more successfully with health care will be of primary 
importance in this regard. 
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Reasons  Share of Descending Households (%) 
Poor  health  and  health-related  expenses  60 88 74 74 71 67 
Marriage/dowry/new  household-related  expenses  31 68   69 18 29 
Funeral-related  expenses  34 49 64 28 15 11 
High-interest private debt  72  52    60     
Drought/irrigation failure/crop disease  18      44  19  11 
Unproductive  land/land  exhaustion     38   8  
Number  of  observations  364 189 172 335 202 252 
Source: Compiled by author; see www.pubpol.duke.edu/krishna for individual research papers and results. 
Note: These percentages sum to more than 100 because more than one reason was involved in most cases. 
 


















Reasons  Share of Households Escaping Poverty (%) 
Diversification  of  income    70   35   78   51   54   69 
Private-sector employment     7   32   61    7    9   19 
Public-sector employment   11   39   13   11    6   10 
Government/nongovernmental organization assistance    8    6      7      4 
Irrigation    27   29     25     
Number  of  observations  499 285 172 348 398 324 
Source: Compiled by author; see www.pubpol.duke.edu/krishna for individual research papers and results. 
Note: These percentages sum to more than 100 because more than one reason was involved in most cases. 
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